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Abstract
Using a closed economy model with a ﬂexible-price good and a sticky-price good we study the condi-
tions under which interest rate rules induce real determinacy and, more importantly, the MSV solution
is learnable in the E-stability sense proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). We show that these
conditions depend not only on how aggressively the rule responds to inﬂation but also on the measure of
inﬂa t i o ni n c l u d e di nt h er u l ea n do nw h e t h e rt h eﬂexible-price good and the sticky-price good are Edge-
worth complements, substitutes or utility separable. We consider three possible measures of inﬂation:
the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, the sticky price inﬂation and the core inﬂation; and we analyze three diﬀerent
types of rules: a forward-looking rule, a contemporaneous rule and a backward-looking rule. Our results
suggest that in order to guarantee a unique equilibrium whose MSV representation is learnable, the
government should implement a backward looking rule that responds exclusively to the sticky-price inﬂa-
tion. Forward-looking and contemporaneous rules that respond to either the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the
core-inﬂation are more prone to induce multiple equilibria and E-instability of the MSV solution. More
importantly backward-looking rules that react to either the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation
may guarantee a unique equilibrium but in these cases the fundamental solution (MSV representation)
is not learnable in the E-stability sense.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years there has been a revival of theoretical literature aimed at understanding the macroeconomic
consequences of implementing interest rate rules in closed and open economies models.1 This revival is
partly explained by two reasons. First since the work by Taylor (1993) it has become common to think
about monetary policy in terms of these rules whereby the central bank maneuvers the nominal interest rate
in response to inﬂation and output. Second there is empirical evidence suggesting that some industrialized
and developing economies have followed in the past, and are following in the present, forward-looking (and
contemporaneous) interest rate rules as a manner to conduct their monetary policy.2
Recently, works by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999), and Woodford (2003), among others, have used New
Keynesian models and pursued determinacy equilibrium analysis for interest rate rules.3 They have found
that these rules may generate aggregate instability in the economy by inducing multiple equilibria (real inde-
terminacy).4 From the economic policy-design perspective, this result implies that the aforementioned rules
may open the possibility of sunspot equilibria and lead the economy to equilibria with undesirable properties
such as a large degree of volatility. This implication in turn suggests that a determinacy of equilibrium
analysis can be used to diﬀerentiate among rules favoring those that guarantee a unique equilibrium with
a lower degree of volatility. Although appealing this argument is still far from complete and may suﬀer
from some drawbacks. The reason is that in the typical determinacy of equilibrium analysis, it is implicitly
assumed that agents can coordinate their actions and learn the equilibria (unique or multiple) induced by
the rule. But relaxing this assumption may have interesting consequences for the design of interest rate rules
rules. On one hand, if agents cannot learn the unique equilibrium targeted by the rule then the economy
may end up diverging from this equilibrium. But if this is the case then it is clear that there are some rules
that although guaranteeing a unique equilibrium, do not ensure that the economy will reach it, as pointed
by Bullard and Mitra (2002). On the other hand, if agents cannot learn sunspot equilibria then one may
doubt the relevance of characterizing rules that lead to multiple equilibria as “bad” ones. After all, if agents
cannot learn sunspot equilibria then they are less likely to occur.
Therefore, it seems clear that a determinacy of equilibrium analysis should in principle be accompanied
by a learnability of equilibrium analysis. Both analyses might help policy makers to distinguish and design
1See Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2003) among others for closed economy models and Ball (1999), Svensson (2000) and
Gali and Monacelli (2004) among others for open economy models..
2See Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Corbo (2000), Schorfheide and Lubik (2004) and Orphanides (1997) among others.
3See also Dupor (1999) and Taylor (1999).
4From now on we will use the terms “multiple equilibria” and “real indeterminacy” (a “unique equilibrium” and “real
determinacy”) interchangeably. By real indeterminacy we mean a situation in which the behavior of one or more (real)
variables of the model is not pinned down by the model. This situation implies that there are multiple equilibria and opens the
possibility of the existence of sunspot equilibria.
2interest rate rules satisfying two criteria or requirements: uniqueness and learnability of the equilibrium.
In this paper we use these two criteria to answer the following question: which measure of inﬂation
should the central bank respond to in the interest rate rule? In order to provide an answer we consider a
“typical” New Keynesian closed economy general equilibrium model with two goods: a ﬂexible-price good
and a sticky-price good. Hence there are three possible measures of inﬂation that the central bank can target
in the rule: the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, the sticky price inﬂation and a convex combination of them (a core
inﬂation). We also consider three diﬀerent timings for the rule: a forward-looking rule, a contemporaneous
rule and a backward-looking rule. In the ﬁrst one, the central bank responds to the expected future (measure
of) inﬂation. In the second one the monetary authority responds to the current inﬂation whereas in the last
one it reacts to the past inﬂation.
The speciﬁc criteria of selection are the following: 1) the rule must guarantee a unique equilibrium and
2) the Minimal State Variable (MSV) representation of this unique equilibrium must be learnable in the
E-Stability sense proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001).5,6
We ﬁnd that the conditions under which these two criteria are satisﬁed depend not only on the interest
rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation but also on the measure of inﬂa t i o ni n c l u d e di nt h er u l ea n do nw e t h e r
the ﬂexible-price good and the sticky-price good are Edgeworth complements, substitutes or utility separable.
The main result of the paper is that under the aforementioned criteria the central bank should follow
a backward looking rule that responds exclusively to the sticky-price inﬂation. Responding to the ﬂexible-
price inﬂation or to the core inﬂation is more prone to induce multiple equilibria (real indeterminacy)
especially when the rule is forward-looking or contemporaneous and when the two goods are either Edgeworth
complements or utility separable. Under these cases targeting the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation
makes also the MSV solution E-unstable.
More importantly backward-looking rules with respect to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation
may guarantee a unique equilibrium but in these cases the MSV solution is not learnable in the E-stability
sense.
Although our selection criteria are diﬀerent, our ﬁndings agree with previous results from the Optimal
Monetary Policy literature that suggest that the central bank should target the sticky-price inﬂation.7 In
addition, this paper is also related to Zanna (2003) and Carlstrom, Fuerst and Ghironi (2004). The ﬁrst
work argues that in the context of a small open economy the interest rate rule should respond to the sticky
5Henceforth we will use the terms “learnability”, “E-stability” and “expectational stability” interchangeably in this paper.
6Evans and Honkapoja (1999, 2001) have argued that a unique equilibrium and sunspot equilibria are not “fragile” if they
are learnable in the sense of E-stability. Technically what they propose is to assume that agents in the model initially do
not have rational expectations but are endowed with a mechanism to form forecasts using recursive learning algorithms and
previous data from the economy. Then they develop some E-stability conditions which govern whether or not a given rational
expectations equilibrium is aymptotically stable under least squares learning.
7See Aoki (2001) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) among others.
3price (non-traded) inﬂation in order to avoid real indeterminacy problems. In fact rules that respond to the
ﬂexible-price (traded) inﬂation are more prone to induce self-fulﬁlling equilibria. The second work focuses
on the a closed economy model where labor is immobile between two sectors that produce two sticky-price
goods. Its main conclusion is that a contemporaneous rule that responds actively to only one of the sticky
price goods inﬂations is suﬃcient to guarantee real determinacy in the whole economy. Both works focus
exclusively on the determinacy of equilibrium analysis without pursuing a learnability analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up with its main assump-
tions of a closed economy model with one composite sticky-price good and one ﬂexible-price good. Section 3
pursues the determinacy of equilibrium and learning (E-stability) analyses for the three timings of the rule
(forward-looking, contemporaneous and backward-looking) that respond exclusively to one of the previously
mentioned measures of inﬂation. Finally Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Household-Firm Unit
Consider a closed economy populated by a large number of identical and inﬁnitely lived household-ﬁrm units,
each of whom derives utility from consumption of two goods, from liquidity services of money, and from not












t denote consumptions of a ﬂexible-price good and a sticky-price good respectively, mt
corresponds to real money balances measured with respect to the ﬂexible-price good, PF
t ,a n dhF
t and
hS
t denote labor eﬀorts required to produce the aforementioned goods. β ∈ (0,1) represents the subjective
discount factor and E0 is the expectational operator conditional on the set of information available at time
0.
By the speciﬁcation in (1) it is clear that we assume separability in the single period utility function
among consumption, real money balances and labor. By doing this we remove the distortionary eﬀects of
transactions money demand.8 More formally we assume the following.
Assumption 1: The functions speciﬁed in (1) satisfy: a) UF ≡ ∂U
∂cF
t > 0,U FF < 0,U S > 0,U SS < 0,
UFS = USF,U SS−USF
US
UF < 0 and UFFUSS−(UFS)
2 > 0; b) Lm > 0 and Lmm < 0; and c) VF ≡ ∂V
∂hF
t < 0,
VFF < 0,V S < 0, VSS < 0 and VSF = VFS =0 .
8This assumption also allows us to write the real money balances that enter the utility of the agent in terms of the price of
the ﬂexible-price good, mt ≡ Mt
PF
t
, without consequences for our results.
4In particular it is important to notice that we assume that the instantaneous utility function of consump-
tion, U(.,.), is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments and that both goods are normal. However
we are not imposing any sign restrictions in the cross derivatives UFS and USF. We assume that they are
equal but in this paper we will consider three cases: cF
t and cS
t can be Edgeworth complements ( UFS > 0),
Edgeworth substitutes (UFS < 0) or they may be utility separable (UFS =0 ) .9
The representative household-ﬁrm unit is engaged in the production of the ﬂexible-price good and the


















t and ˜ hN
t denote the labor hired by the household-ﬁrm unit for the production of the ﬂexible-price
and the sticky-price goods respectively; zF
t and zS
t are productivity shocks whose logarithms, ˆ zF
t =l n ( zF
t )
and ˆ zS
t =l n ( zS














S ∈ (0,1) and ξ
F
t ∼ N(0,σF) and ξ
S
t ∼ N(0,σS). Technology shocks are the only source of
fundamentals uncertainty and that they are not cross-correlated. The structure of the production functions
is completed by the following assumption.
Assumption 2: fh > 0, fhh < 0,g h > 0, and ghh < 0.
In other words the production functions are strictly increasing and strictly concave in their arguments.
The consumption of the stick-price good, cS
t , is assumed to be a composite good made of a continuum of
intermediate diﬀerentiated goods. The aggregator function is described of the Dixit-Stiglitz type. We assume
that each household-ﬁrm unit is the monopolistic producer of one variety of sticky-price intermediate goods.
The demand for the intermediate good is of the form CS
t d





satisfying d(1) = 1 and d0 (1) = −µ,
where CS
t denotes the level of aggregate demand for the sticky-price good, ˜ PS
t is the nominal price of the
intermediate sticky-price good produced by the household-ﬁrm and PS
t i st h ep r i c eo ft h ec o m p o s i t es t i c k y -
price good. The household-ﬁrm unit that behaves as a monopolist in the production of the sticky-price good,
sets the price of the good it supplies, ˜ PS
t , taking the level of aggregate demand for the sticky-price good as
given. The monopolist is constrained to satisfy demand at that price. That is




























with αp ∈ (0,1) and σ,a > 0 satisﬁes Assumption 1a) and the sign of UFS is determined by the values of the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution, a, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1

















Following Rotemberg (1982) we introduce sluggish price adjustment in the production of the intermediate
sticky-price good. We assume the household ﬁrm unit faces a quadratic resource cost (QS
t ) in the inﬂation












where the parameter γ measures the degree of price stickiness. If γ =0then prices are ﬂexible. The higher
γ is the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices.
Moreover we assume that the representative household-ﬁrm unit can invest in a bond issued by the
government, Bt, that pays a gross nominal interest rate, Rt. The real value of this asset is denoted by
bt = Bt/PF









t , for producing goods. Letting denote nt ≡ mt + bt denote the real ﬁnancial





















































































denotes the gross ﬂexible-price good inﬂation, T
g
t is the lump-sum transfers from the
government and the expressions in square brackets correspond to proﬁts that the representative agent receives
from selling the ﬂexible-price good and the sticky-price composite good.









¢ ≥ 0 (6)






t , ˜ PS
t } and
{mt,n t}∞
t=0 in order to maximize (1) subject to (4), (5) and (6), given the initial condition n0 and the









t }. Note that since the utility function speciﬁed in
(1) implies that the preferences of the agent display non-sasiation then constraints (5) and (6) both hold
with equality.












































































































































where  t and λt correspond to the Lagrange multipliers of (4) and (5) respectively.
The interpretation of the ﬁrst order conditions is straightforward. Condition (7) is the usual intertem-
poral envelope condition that makes the marginal utility of consumption of ﬂexible-price goods equal to
the marginal utility of wealth (λt). Condition (8) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between
ﬂexible-price and the sticky-price goods must be equal to the relative price between these goods. In addition
conditions (9) makes the marginal rate of substitution between labor supplied for the production of the
ﬂexible-price good and consumption of the ﬂexible-price good equal to the real wage paid for producing the
ﬂexible-price good. Condition (10) does the same for labor supplied for the production of the sticky-price
good but in this case the real wage corresponds to the ratio between the nominal wage paid for producing
the sticky-price good and the ﬂexible price. Conditions (11) (respectively 12) equalizes the marginal cost
7to the ratio between the real wage and the marginal product of labor for producing the ﬂexible-price good
(sticky-price good). Equation (14) represents the demand for real balances of money that, under Assumption
1, is as an increasing function of consumption of the ﬂexible-price good and a decreasing function of the
gross nominal interest rate. And ﬁnally condition (15) implies a standard asset pricing equation.
2.2 The Government
The government issues two nominal liabilities: money, M
g
t , and a domestic bond, B
g
t , that pays a gross
nominal interest rate Rt. It also makes transfers , PF
t T
g
t , pays interest on its debt, (Rt −1)B
g
t , and receives







t denote the real government liabilities at the



















We assume that the government follows a generic Ricardian ﬁscal policy. Under this policy, it picks
the path of transfers, T
g













We deﬁne monetary policy as an interest rate feedback rule whereby the government sets the gross








with j = −1,0,1 (18)
where π∗ corresponds to the inﬂation target and R∗ = π∗/β. We will consider three diﬀerent timings.









, or backward-looking, when it




. The measure of inﬂation that we consider in (18) corresponds













. In other words,
πt = wπF
t +( 1− w)πS
t (19)
where w ∈ [0,1] is the weight that the government puts on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation. Note that when the
government sets w =1t h e nt h er u l er e s p o n d se x c l u s i v e l yt ot h eﬂexible-price inﬂation, πt = πF
t .O n t h e
other hand if the government sets w =0then the rule responds solely to the sticky-price inﬂation, πt = πS
t .
8We will assume that the government responds aggressively to inﬂation. That is, at the inﬂation rate
target, in response of a one percent of inﬂation the government will raise the nominal interest by more that
one percent. In the terminology of Leeper (1991) this rule is called an "active" rule.
2.3 The Equilibrium
We will focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all the monopolistic producers of sticky-price goods
pick the same price. Hence ˜ PS
t = PN
t . Since all the monopolists face the same wage rate, WS
t , the same
technology shock , zS






, then they will demand the same amount
of labor ˜ hS
t = hS
t . In equilibrium the money market, the labor markets, the ﬂexible-price good market and





t = ˇ hF
t (21)
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(24)





































that corresponds to the augmented Phillips curve for the sticky-price goods inﬂation.10 Furthermore using
























that correspond to the Euler equations for consumption of the ﬂexible-price and the sticky-price goods















10We would have derived a similar augmented Phillips curve if we had follow Calvo’s (1983) approach.
9We are ready to provide a deﬁnition of an equilibrium in an economy where the government follows a
Ricardian ﬁscal policy and implements an interest rate rule.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the initial condition n
g


















t=0 satisfying 1) conditions (25)-(28), 2) the
market clearing conditions (23) and (24), 3) the intertemporal version of (16) together with (17), 4) the
interest rate rule (18) and 5) the deﬁnition of core-inﬂation (19).




t ,τ t,π F
t ,π S
t ,R t}∞
t=0 it is possible to derive the set of processes
{λt,q t,m t}∞
t=0 using (7), (8) and (14) whereas nt = n
g
t.
For our determinacy analysis and learning analysis we can reduce the model further. In particular
note that since the ﬁscal policy is assumed to be Ricardian, we know that the intertemporal version of
the government’s budget constraint in conjunction with its transversality condition will be always satisﬁed.
Hence for the aforementioned analyses we will not consider (16) and (17).
2.4 The Log-linearized Economy
In this subsection we derive a log-linearized version of the system of equations that describe the competitive
equilibrium of the economy, as stated in Deﬁnition 1. As explained before we exclude (16) and (17) given
that the ﬁscal policy is Ricardian.
Speciﬁcally we log-linearize the rule (18), the deﬁnition of core-inﬂation (19) and the conditions (23),
(24), and (25)-(28) around a non-stochastic steady state. In particular note that at the steady-state we have
that ¯ π =¯ πF =¯ πS. Manipulating the log-linearized equations we obtain the following set of equations
¯ cFˆ cF
t = α¯ cSˆ cS








































t = βEt(ˆ π
S
t+1)+βδˆ cS
t + βκ4ˆ zS
t + βκ5ˆ zF
t (32)
ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ πt+j with j = −1,0,1 (33)
ˆ πt = wˆ π
F








2 UFF + VFF
κ1 =
fVFF − (fh)
2 UF + fhh¯ cFUSF
fhhUF +( fh)
2 UFF + VFF
(35)
  =
(α1UFS + USS)¯ cS
US
χ =











































and all the derivatives of the functions U(.,.),V(.,.),f (.) and g(.) are evaluated at the steady state; ¯ cF and
¯ cS denote the steady state levels of consumption for the ﬂexible-price and the sticky-price goods, respectively,
¯ π = π∗ and ˆ xt =l o g ( xt
¯ x ). To complete the system of log-linearized equations that describes the dynamics of
the economy we have to consider the processes (3).
In addition for subsequent analysis it is useful to characterize the sign of some of the coeﬃcients of the
log-linearized system. The following Lemma accomplishes this goal.
11Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows that a) α T 0 if and only if USF T 0; b)  <0; c) χ>0;
and d) δ>0
Proof. See Appendix.
We are now ready to pursue the determinacy and learnability of equilibrium analyses.
3 The Determinacy and Learning of Equilibrium Analyses
In this section we will study the determinacy and learnability of equilibrium properties for three diﬀerent
rules (forward-looking, contemporaneous and backward-looking rules) that may react to diﬀerent measures
of inﬂation. The reason of pursuing determinacy of equilibrium and learnability analyses for these rules
lies on two intertwined arguments. The ﬁrst one points out that interest rate rules may generate aggregate
instability in the economy by inducing multiple equilibria (real indeterminacy).11 The second one emphasizes
that some rules that although guaranteeing a unique equilibrium, do not ensure that the economy will reach
it.12
Both arguments are important from an economic policy-design perspective. The ﬁrst one implies that
the aforementioned rules may open the possibility of sunspot equilibria and lead the economy to equilibria
with undesirable properties such as a large degree of volatility. This implication in turn suggests that a
determinacy of equilibrium analysis can be used to diﬀerentiate among rules favoring those that guarantee a
unique equilibrium. However this suggestion although appealing may suﬀer from some drawbacks that lead
to the second argument. In the typical determinacy of equilibrium analysis, it is implicitly assumed that
agents can coordinate their actions and learn the equilibria (unique or multiple) induced by the rule. But
if agents cannot learn the unique equilibrium targeted by the rule then the economy may end up diverging
from this equilibrium. If this is the case then it is clear that there are some rules that although inducing
real determinacy do not ensure that the economy will be driven into the targeted equilibrium.13
11See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1999), Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2003), among others.
12See Bullard and Mitra (2002).
13Moreover if agents cannot learn sunspot equilibria then one may doubt the relevance of characterizing rules that lead to
multiple equilibria as “bad” ones. After all, if agents cannot learn sunspot equilibria then they are less likely to occur.
12Therefore, as pointed by Bullard and Mitra (2002), an interest rate rule should not only guarantee a
unique equilibrium but also a "learnable" equilibrium. This suggests that a determinacy of equilibrium
analysis for interest rate rules should in principle be accompanied by a learnability of equilibrium analysis.
Both analyses may help policy makers to distinguish and design rules satisfying two requirements: uniqueness
and learnability of the equilibrium.
For both the determinacy and learnability analyses we will focus on a log-linearized version of the system
of equations that describe the competitive equilibrium in this economy, as stated in Deﬁnition 1. Before
ﬁnding this log-linearized version, it is useful to describe the methodology that we will apply to pursue the
aforementioned analyses.
3.1 The Methodology
For the determinacy of equilibrium analysis we will apply the results for Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that
help to characterize whether a rational expectations linear system of equations such as
ˆ xt = ΛEt(ˆ xt+1) (39)
has a unique equilibrium, multiple equilibria or no equilibrium, where ˆ xt is a system of s × 1 vector of
endogenous variables, and Λ is a s×s matrix of constants. As is well known the analysis consists on comparing
the number of non-explosive eigenvalues of the matrix, Λ, with the number of non-predetermined variables.
Then in the determinacy of equilibrium of a speciﬁc rule that responds to a particular measure of inﬂation
we reduce the log-linearized version of the economy described by (29)-(34) and (3) to the representation in
(39) in order to apply Blanchard and Kahn’s results.14
On the other hand as a criterion of “learnability” of an equilibrium we will use the concept of “E-
stability” proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001). That is, an equilibrium is “learnable” if it
is “E-Stable”. Consequently we start by assuming that agents in our model no longer are endowed with
rational expectations. Instead they have adaptive rules whereby agents form expectations using recursive
14See also Benhabib and Farmer (1999) and Farmer (1999).
13least squares updating and data from the system. Then we derive the conditions for expectational stability
(E-stability). We will focus on the E-stability concept for the following reason. In models that display a
unique equilibrium (real determinacy models), Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1999,
2001) have shown that under some general conditions, the notional time concept of expectational stability of
a rational expectation equilibrium governs the local convergence of real time adaptive learning algorithms.
Speciﬁcally they have shown that under E-stability, recursive least-squares learning is locally convergent to
the rational expectations equilibrium.
Then we need to deﬁne the concept of E-stability. To do so it is useful to explain the methodology
proposed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001). Consider the model
ˆ yt = η + ΩEtˆ yt+1 + Γˆ yt−1 + Ψˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (40)
where ˆ yt is a s×1 vector of endogenous variables, η is a s×1 vector of constants vector, Ω, Γ, Ψ, and Φ are
s × s matrices of constants, and ˆ zt is a s × 1 vector of exogenous variables which follows a stationary VAR
whose s × 1 vector of shocks consists of white noise terms. In addition Et denotes in general (non-rational)
expectations. Next, assume that the agents follow a perceived law of motion (PLM) that in the case of real
determinacy corresponds to the fundamental solution or Minimal State Variable (MSV) representation15
ˆ yt = k + P ˆ yt−1 + Qˆ zt (41)
where k, P, Q are conformable vectors and matrices and are to be derived by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. Iterating forward this law of motion and using it to eliminate all the forecasts (Etˆ yt+1 =
k + P ˆ yt + QΦˆ zt) in the model speciﬁed in (40) we can derive the implied actual law of motion (ALM)
ˆ yt = kA + PAˆ yt−1 + QAˆ zt (42)
Then we obtain the T-mapping T(k,P,Q)=( kA,PA,Q A), whose ﬁxed points correspond to the rational
expectations equilibrium. An equilibrium described by the MSV representation is said to be E-stable if this
mapping is stable at the equilibrium in question. More formally a ﬁxed point of the T-mapping is E-stable
15See McCallum (1983) and Uhlig (1999).
14provided that the diﬀerential equation
d(k,P,Q)
dτn
= T(k,P,Q) − (k,P,Q) (43)
is locally asymptotically stable at that particular ﬁxed point, where τn is deﬁned as the “notional” time.
More speciﬁcally, the ALM of the system (40) corresponds to
ˆ yt =( I − ΩP)−1 [η + Ωk + Γˆ yt−1 +( ΩQΦ + Ψ)ˆ zt]
where I is the identity matrix. Using this ALM and the PLM in (41) we ﬁnd the T-Mapping
T(k,P,Q)=( kA,PA,Q A)=[ ( I − ΩP)−1(η + Ωk),(I − ΩP)−1Γ,(I − ΩP)−1(ΩQΦ + Ψ)] (44)
whose ﬁxed point correspond to the rational expectation equilibrium and can be used to determine the
coeﬃcients matrices ¯ k, ¯ P,and ¯ Q of the MSV solutions. That is ¯ k, ¯ P,and ¯ Q are the solutions to
(I − ΩP − Ω)k = η ΩP2 − P + Γ =0 and (I − ΩP)Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ (45)
Using (44) the conditions under which the diﬀerential equation (43) is locally asymptotically stable are
derived and stated in Proposition 10.3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). They basically say that an MSV
solution of the form (41) to the system (40) is E-stable if all the eigenvalues of the matrices evaluated at
¯ k, ¯ P,and ¯ Q,
DTk =( I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω DTP =
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Γ
¤0
⊗ [(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω] and DTQ = Φ0 ⊗ [(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω]
(46)
have real parts less than one. Moreover the solution is not E-stable if any of the eigenvalues has real part
larger than one.
It is important to observe that a fundamental part in the learnability analysis consists of making explicit
what agents know when they form their forecasts. In the E-stability analysis literature it is common to
15assume that when agents form their expectations Etˆ yt, they do not know ˆ yt. In this paper this assumption
may be inconsistent with the assumptions that we use to derive the equations of the model.16 Henceforth
for the learnability analysis we will assume that when forming expectations agents know ˆ yt.
To conclude and summarize, in order to determine whether a speciﬁc rule that responds to a particular
measure of inﬂation induces a learnable MSV representation of the equilibrium we proceed as follows. First
we reduce the log-linearized version of the economy described by (29)-(34) and (3) to a similar system as in
(40). Then we calculate the MSV solution of this system and check if all the eigenvalues of the matrices in
(46) have real parts less than one.
3.2 Forward-Looking Rules
In this section we focus on interest rate rules reacting to one-period ahead (expected) inﬂation, i.e. for-
ward looking rules. Our analysis is motivated by the forward-looking rules estimations of Clarida Gali and
Gertler (1998,2000) for the US, United kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan; and the estimations
by Corbo(2000) for Chile, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Speciﬁcally we focus on rules of the
following type
ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ πt+1 with ρπ > 1 (47)
whereby the government responds actively to the expected core-inﬂation rate, ˆ π.
Using equations (29)-(32), (33) and (47) we obtain the system
ˆ yt = η + ΩEtˆ yt+1 + Ψˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (48)
where ˆ yt =[ ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0, ˆ zt =[ ˆ zF
t , ˆ zS





16In particular notice that for the derivation of the ﬁrst order conditions of the representative agent we assume that EtPN
t (j)=
PN
t (j) (or in a symmetric equilibrium EtPN
t = PN
t ). Therefore assuming in the learnability analysis that the agents do not
know PN
t when forming expectations would have some implications for the speciﬁcation of the model. Speciﬁcally it would
require to replace ˆ πS



















. The form of Ψ is omitted since it is not required for the following analysis. Moreover,
β corresponds to the subjective discount factor, ρπ is the interest response coeﬃcient to core inﬂation, w is
the weight that the government puts on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation to construct the core inﬂation (see 34),










The solution of (48) will pin down the dynamics of ˆ yt =[ ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0. Then using these and equations (29),
(30), (34), (47) and processes (3) we can ﬁnd the set of processes {ˆ cF
t , ˆ π
F
t , ˆ πt,R t}.
To complete the speciﬁcation of the system we study the properties of θ and τ in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 U n d e rA s s u m p t i o n s1a n d2a )θ T 0 if and only if USF T 0; b) if USF T 0 then τ T 1;c)
τ>0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The following Proposition studies active forward-looking rules that responds to the core inﬂation. It
provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for these rules to deliver a unique and learnable equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider the system deﬁned in (48). Let ρw
π =
[βδ−2(1+β) ]
βδ−2(1+β) τw and assume that the government
follows an active forward-looking rule in terms of the core inﬂation (ˆ π) described by ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ πt+1 with
ρπ > 1.
a) If USF ≤ 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth substitutes or utility separable) then a suﬃcient and
necessary condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium is that 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π for any w ∈ (0,1).
Moreover this is a suﬃcient condition for the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt of this equilibrium to be
E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ.
b) If USF > 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth complements) then a suﬃcient and necessary condition
for the existence of a unique equilibrium is that 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π for any w ∈ (0,1/τ). Moreover this is a
suﬃcient condition for the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt of this equilibrium to be E-stable, where ¯ k =0
and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ.
17Proof. See the Appendix.
The conditions stated by Proposition 1 under which active forward-looking rules deliver a unique and
learnable equilibrium depend not only on the interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation, but also on
the weight w and on whether are ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, Edgeworth complements or utility
separable. The following paragraphs elaborate on this statement.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fw, the weight that the government puts in the ﬂexible-price inﬂation to construct the
core inﬂation, can be grasped by realizing that
∂ρw
π
∂w < 0. Which means that as the government puts more
weight on ﬂexible-price inﬂa t i o nt h e nt h er a n g e1 <ρ π <ρ w
π under which an active forward-looking rule
will deliver a unique learnable and unique equilibrium will be reduced. In fact it is possible to prove that
as long as ρπ >ρ w
π then the forward-looking rule will always deliver multiple equilibria. This observation
has dramatic consequences for the performance of forward-looking rules when the goods ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are
either Edgeworth complements (USF > 0) or utility separable (USF =0 ). To understand this we can study
thoroughly the properties of the function ρw
π and construct Figures 1,2 and 3 that correspond to the cases
when the goods are Edgeworth substitutes, utility separable or Edgeworth complements, repectively. These
Figures show not only the values for ρπ and w for which forward-looking rules that respond to the core
inﬂation will deliver unique and learnable equilibria (real determinacy and E-stability) but also the values
for which there exists multiple equilibria (real indeterminacy). Within the value regions for which there exist
multiple equilibria for active rules, we also characterize whether the MSV solution is E-stable or E-unstable.
In the ﬁgures "D" and "I" stand for real determinacy (unique equilibrium) and real indeterminacy (multiple
equilibria) respectively. Whereas "ES" stands for E-stable and "EU" for E-unstable.
In all these ﬁgures it is clear that ρw
π is a decreasing function of w and that its intercept with the ρπ-axis
when w =0is equal to ρ0
π. Figure 1 corresponds to the case in which ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth complements
(USF > 0). In this case it is clear that active forward-looking rules will always lead to real indeterminacy
for either w>1
τ and any ρπ > 1 or for w ∈ (0, 1
τ) whenever that ρπ >ρ w
π. Only rules satisfying 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π
and w ∈ (0, 1
τ) (characterized by part b of Proposition 1) will deliver unique and learnable equilibria. Figure
2 corresponds to the case in which ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are utility separable (USF =0 ). In this case the region of real
181
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determinacy and E-stability is increased with respect to the previous case. The reason is that the intercept of
ρw
π with the ρπ- a x i si ss t i l lρ0
π. However the suﬃcient and necessary condition for ρπ of part a) of Proposition
1 will hold for any w ∈ (0,1). Nevertheless if w is very closed to one then active rules will still induce multiple
equilibria. Figure 3 is associated with the case when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes (USF < 0). In
this case the possible problems of real indeterminacy seem to subside although it is still true that the region
of real determinacy and E-stability characterized by part a) of Proposition 1 decreases as w increases.
This analysis suggests that it is important to study active forward-looking rules that react exclusively to
either the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, ˆ π
F, or the sticky-price inﬂation, ˆ π
S. After all these two cases correspond
to react to the core inﬂation and set w =1and w =0respectively. By studying these two cases we will
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20The following Proposition summarizes the determinacy of equilibrium and learnability results for an
active rule that responds solely to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation.
Proposition 2 Consider the system deﬁned in (48) with w =1 .L e tρ1
π =
[βδ−2(1+β) ]
βδ−2(1+β) τ and assume that the
government follows an active forward-looking rule in terms of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation (ˆ π
F) described by
ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
F
t+1 with ρπ > 1.
a) If USF < 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes) then a suﬃcient and necessary condition for
the existence of a unique equilibrium is that 1 <ρ π <ρ 1
π. Moreover this is a suﬃcient condition for the
MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k+ ¯ Qˆ zt of this equilibrium to be E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q−ΩQΦ = Ψ.
b) If USF ≥ 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth complements or utility separable) then there is NOT
av a l u eo f ρπ > 1 for which there exists a unique equilibrium and the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt is
E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally for any ρπ such that ρπ > 1 the
rule will always induce multiple equilibria and more importantly the MSV solution is NOT learnable in
the E-stability sense.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 2 show that conditions under which active forward-looking rules that respond
exclusively to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation deliver a unique and learnable equilibrium depend strongly on
whether are ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, Edgeworth complements or utility separable. In particular
when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth complements or utility separable, then the aforementioned rules will
always induce aggregate instability by generating multiple equilibria. More interestingly even if we focus on
the MSV solution, we ﬁnd that this representation is never E-stable.











w h e r ew eh a v ei g n o r e dt h et e r m sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hˆ zF
t . With this equation and equations (31) and (32), it
is possible to construct a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth complements or
utility separable. We pursue this goal.
Assume that agents expect a higher sticky-price inﬂation. When ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth complements
t h e nb yL e m m a2w ek n o wt h a tτ>1. If in addition the rule is active ρπ > 1, then by (51) we see
21that higher expectations of the sticky price-inﬂation will be associated with with higher expectations of the
ﬂexible price inﬂation but satisfying Etˆ π
F
t+1 <E tˆ π
S
t+1. If the rule responds actively and exclusively to the
ﬂexible-price inﬂation ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
F
t+1 then the real interest rate measured with respect to the expected
sticky-price inﬂation, ˆ Rt − Etˆ π
S
t+1, will decrease stimulating consumption of the sticky-price good (see 31).
As a response to this increase in consumption ﬁrms will raise the price of the sticky-price good inducing a
higher sticky-price inﬂation (see 33). Then the original expectations of a higher sticky-price inﬂation are
validated.
When ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are utility separable, then by Lemma 2 we know that τ =1 . But this and (51) imply
that Etˆ π
F
t+1 =0 . Now assume that agents expect a higher sticky-price inﬂation. Since the rule responds
actively and only to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
F
t+1 then the real interest rate measured with
respect to the expected sticky-price inﬂation, ˆ Rt − Etˆ π
S
t+1 will decrease and the same mechanism explained
above self-validates the original expectations.
Next consider the case when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes. From Lemma 2 we know that
0 <τ<1. If in addition the rule is active ρπ > 1 and satisﬁes ρπ < 1
τ , then by (51) we see that higher
expectations of the sticky price-inﬂation will be associated with higher expectations of the ﬂexible price
inﬂation but in this case we have that Etˆ π
F
t+1 >E tˆ π
S
t+1. If the rule responds actively and exclusively to the
ﬂexible-price inﬂation ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
F
t+1 then it is possible that the real interest rate measured with respect
to the expected sticky-price inﬂation, ˆ Rt − Etˆ π
S
t+1 will increase reducing consumption of the sticky-price
good (see 31). As a response to this decline in consumption ﬁrms will decrease the price of the sticky-price
good inducing a lower sticky-price inﬂation (see 33). Then the original expectations of a higher sticky-price
inﬂation are not validated.
In a similar way it is possible to grasp the intuition of why the MSV solution is not learnable (E-stable)
when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth complements or utility separable whereas it is learnable if ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are
Edgeworth substitutes. In order to do so we use (51) and the rule ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
F
t+1 to derive the real interest
rate measured with respect to the expected sticky-price inﬂation










Consider the case in which they are Edgeworth complements or utility separable (τ ≥ 1) and recall
that ρπ > 1. According to (52) a deviation of people’s expected sticky-price inﬂation from the rational
expectations value will always lead to a decrease in the real interest rate measured with respect to the
expected sticky-price inﬂation. But this will stimulate consumption of the sticky-price good by (31) which in
turn will increase the sticky-price inﬂation by (33). Over time this mechanism leads to upward revisions of
both the expected sticky-price inﬂation and the expected consumption of the sticky-price goods. Therefore
the policy of targeting actively the ﬂexible-price inﬂation will not oﬀ-set the initial deviation from the rational
expectations equilibrium. It will move the economy further away from it.
On the contrary assume that the goods are Edgeworth substitutes. In this case 0 <τ<1. Using (52) we
can see that a deviation of people’s expected sticky-price inﬂation from the rational expectations value may
induce an increase in the real interest rate measur e dw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ee x p e c t e ds t i c k y - p r i c ei n ﬂation, as
long as 1 <ρ π < 1
τ . But this will decrease consumption of the sticky-price good by (31) which in turn will
decrease the sticky-price inﬂation by ( 33). Over time this mechanism leads to upward revisions of both the
expected sticky-price inﬂation and the expected consumption of the sticky-price goods. Hence in this case
the policy of targeting actively the ﬂexible-price inﬂation is able to lead the original people’s expectations
towards the the rational expectations value.
The analysis of rules that respond to either the core-inﬂation or the ﬂexible-price inﬂation poses the
question of whether it is possible to design a rule that induces a unique and learnable equilibrium without
depending on the joint characteristics of ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t . The answer to this can be found in active forward-looking
rules that respond solely to the sticky-price inﬂation. The following proposition makes this point.
Proposition 3 Consider the system deﬁned in (48) with w =0 .L e t ρ0
π =1−
2(1+β) 
βδ and assume that
the government follows an active forward-loo k i n gr u l ei nt e r m so ft h es t i c k y - p r i c ei n ﬂation (ˆ π
S) described by
ˆ Rt = ρπEtˆ π
S
t+1 with ρπ > 1. Then regardless of whether USF T 0 (that is whether ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth
23substitutes, complements or utility separable),a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the existence of a unique
equilibrium is that 1 <ρ π <ρ 0
π. Moreover this is a suﬃcient and a necessary condition for the MSV solution
ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt of this equilibrium to be E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 3 are equivalent to the ones in Bullard and Mitra (2002) and their intuition is
straightforward.
3.3 Contemporaneous Rules
In this subsection we study thoroughly active contemporaneous rules that may respond to the core inﬂation,
the ﬂexible price-inﬂation or the sticky-price inﬂation. The motivation for studying contemporaneous rules
stems from empirical evidence such as Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). Speciﬁcally we focus on rules of the
following type
ˆ Rt = ρπˆ πt with ρπ > 1 (53)
whereby the government responds actively to the current core-inﬂation rate, ˆ π.
Using equations (29)-(32), (33) and (53) we obtain the system
ˆ yt = η + ΩEtˆ yt+1 + Ψˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (54)
where ˆ yt =[ ˆ π
F
t , ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0, ˆ zt =[ ˆ zF
t , ˆ zS
















































. The form of Ψ is omitted since it is not required for the following analysis. Moreover,
β corresponds to the subjective discount factor, ρπ is the interest response coeﬃcient to core inﬂation, w is
the weight that the government puts on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation to construct the core inﬂation (see 34),
24α,   and δ are constants deﬁned in (35), (36) and (37) and characterized by Lemma 1, and τ is a constant
deﬁned in (50) and characterized in Lemma 2.
Surprisingly active contemporaneous rules that react to the current core-inﬂation always deliver real
indeterminacy regardless of whether ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, complements or utility separable.
Moreover although the MSV solution maybe learnable when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, it is not
E-stable when these goods are complements or utility separable, for any ρπ > 1. The following Proposition
formalizes these statements.
Proposition 4 Consider the system deﬁned in (54). Assume that the government follows an active con-
temporaneous rule in terms of the core inﬂation (ˆ π) described by ˆ Rt = ρπˆ πt with ρπ > 1.
a) If USF ≥ 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth complements or utility separable) then there are no
values of ρπ > 1 and w ∈ (0,1) for which there exists a unique equilibrium and the MSV solution
ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt is E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ. More speciﬁcally for any ρπ, such
that ρπ > 1, and w ∈ (0,1) t h er u l ew i l la l w a y si n d u c em u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i aa n dt h eM S Vs o l u t i o ni s
NOT learnable in the E-stability sense.
b) If USF < 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes) then there are no values of ρπ and w ∈ (0,1)
for which there exists a unique equilibrium. However the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt,w h e r e¯ k =0and
¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ, may be E-stable for some ρπ > 1 and w ∈ (0,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
It is surprising that active contemporaneous rules with respect to the core-inﬂation will always deliver
multiple equilibria. To understand this point it is useful to study rules that respond exclusively to either
the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the sticky-price inﬂation. Note that although we can use the system(54) with
Ω deﬁned in (55) in order to analyze rules that react to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, we cannot use the same
system to investigate rules that respond to the sticky-price inﬂation. For the former rules we can use the
aforementioned system and matrix with w =1 . However for the latter rules some entries of Ω will not be
deﬁned when w =0 .
Proposition 5 Consider the system deﬁned in (54) with w =1 . Assume that the government follows an
active contemporaneous rule in terms of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation (ˆ π
F) described by ˆ Rt = ρπˆ π
F
t with ρπ > 1.
a) If USF ≥ 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth complements or utility separable) then there is not a
value of ρπ for which there exists a unique equilibrium and the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k+ ¯ Qˆ zt is E-stable,
where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q−ΩQΦ = Ψ. More speciﬁcally for any ρπ, such that ρπ > 1, and w ∈ (0,1)
the rule will always induce multiple equilibria and the MSV solution is not learnable in the E-stability
sense..
25b) If USF < 0 (ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes) then there is not a value of ρπ for which
there exists a unique equilibrium. However the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt,w h e r e¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves
Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ, m a yb eE - s t a b l ef o rs o m eρπ > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 suggests that the previous results for active contemporaneous rules that respond to the
core-inﬂation are mainly explained by the fact that targeting the core inﬂation indirectly implies targeting the
ﬂexible-price inﬂation. In particular, it is important to emphasize that when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth
complements or utility separable, an active contemporaneous rule that responds to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation
will induce multiple equilibria. In addition in this case the MSV solution is not learnable.
To verify that the results for rules that respond to the core inﬂation are mainly explained by the results for
rules that react to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation we proceed by studying contemporaneous rules that respond
exclusively to the sticky-price inﬂation. As argued before we need to ﬁnd the system that describes the
economy. Using equations (29)-(32), (33) and the rule ˆ Rt = ρπˆ π
S
t we obtain the system
ˆ yt = η + ΩEtˆ yt+1 + Ψˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (56)
where ˆ yt =[ ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0, ˆ zt =[ ˆ zF
t , ˆ zS

























. The form of Ψ is omitted since it is not required for the following analysis. Moreover,
β corresponds to the subjective discount factor, ρπ is the interest response coeﬃcient to core inﬂation, α,  
and δ are constants deﬁned in (35), (36) and (37) and characterized by Lemma 1.
Proposition 6 Consider the system deﬁned in (56). Assume that the government follows an active con-
temporaneous rule in terms of the sticky-price inﬂation (ˆ π
S) described by ˆ Rt = ρπˆ π
S
t with ρπ > 1.T h e n
regardless of whether USF T 0 (that is whether ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, complements or utility
separable), a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium is that ρπ > 1.
Moreover this is a suﬃcient and a necessary condition for the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k+ ¯ Qˆ zt of this equilibrium
to be E-stable, where ¯ k =0and ¯ Q solves Q − ΩQΦ = Ψ.
26Proof. See the Appendix.
The results of Proposition 6 conﬁrm our previous assertion about how the results for rules that respond
t ot h ec o r ei n ﬂation are practically explained by the eﬀect of the ﬂexible-price inﬂa t i o no nt h ec o r ei n ﬂation.
In particular if the rule reacts solely to the current sticky-price inﬂation, that is when the weight w on the
ﬂexible-price inﬂation is zero and consequently the core inﬂation coincides with the sticky-price inﬂation
then active rules will deliver a unique and learnable equilibrium.
Our analyses for contemporaneous and forward-looking rules with diﬀerent measures of inﬂation have
some important policy implications. First forward-looking and contemporaneous rules that respond to either
the core-inﬂation or the ﬂexible-price inﬂation are more prone to deliver real indeterminacy than rules that
respond exclusively to the sticky price inﬂation. This result is very clear when ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are either Edgeworth
complements or utility separable. More importantly under these assumptions about ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t , the MSV
solution is never learnable for active forward-looking and contemporaneous rules that respond to the ﬂexible-
price inﬂation. These results in tandem with the results of Proposition 6 suggest that the measure of inﬂation
that should be included in the rules is the sticky-price inﬂation. The natural question that arises is wether
this policy recommendation is still valid for backward-looking rules. We proceed pursuing the analysis of
these rules.
3.4 Backward-Looking Rules
In this subsection we pursue the determinacy of equilibrium and learning analyses for active backward-
looking rules that may react to the core inﬂation, the ﬂexible price-inﬂation or the sticky-price inﬂation.
The motivation for studying these rules comes not only from an empirical motivation such as Taylor (1993)
but also form a theoretical motivation. In fact works by Benhabib et al. (2001), Bernanke and Woodford
(1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) suggest that backward-looking rules are less prone to induce multiple
equilibria.
We start our analysis by studying rules that respond exclusively and actively to the core-inﬂation. That
is
27ˆ Rt = ρπˆ πt−1 with ρπ > 1 (58)
For the determinacy of equilibrium analysis we use equations (29)-(32), (33) and (58) to obtain the system
ˆ xt = ΛEtˆ xt+1 + Σˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (59)
where ˆ xt =[ ˆ Rt, ˆ π
F
t , ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0, ˆ xt =[ ˆ zF
t , ˆ zS
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. The form of Ψ is omitted since it is not required for the following analysis. Moreover,
β corresponds to the subjective discount factor, ρπ is the interest response coeﬃcient to core inﬂation, w is
the weight that the government puts on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation to construct the core inﬂation (see 34),
α,   and δ are constants deﬁned in (35), (36) and (37) and characterized by Lemma 1, and τ is a constant
deﬁned in (50) and characterized in Lemma 2.
On the other hand since there is a predetermined variable (an endogenous state variable) then for the
E-stability analysis we utilize (29)-(32), (33) and (58) to derive the system
ˆ yt = η + ΩEtˆ yt+1 + Γˆ yt−1 + Ψˆ zt and ˆ zt = Φˆ zt−1 + ξt (61)
where ˆ xt =[ˆ Rt, ˆ π
F
t , ˆ π
S
t ,ˆ cS
t ]0, ˆ xt =[ ˆ zF
t , ˆ zS
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. κ1, κ4, and κ5 are constants deﬁned in (35) and (38).
For the determinacy of equilibrium analysis and for the learning analysis it is not possible to derive
analytical results. Therefore we have to simulate. We will assume some functional forms and assign some
reasonable values for the parameters associated with these forms. Then we will apply the methodology
described in 3.1 taking into account that for the E-stability analysis we have to ﬁnd the the MSV solution
described by ˆ yt = k + P ˆ yt−1 + Qˆ zt.








































where αp ∈ (0,1), σ,a > 0 and ξ
p ≥ 0. Note that they satisfy Assumption 1. In particular the sign of UFS is
determined by the values of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, a, and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, 1
σ.T h a ti sUFS T 0 if and only if 1
σ T a.










S ∈ (0,1). They satisfy Assumption 2.
The time unit is a quarter. Then we set β =0 .98. We will assume that the share of sticky-price goods
is bigger than the share of ﬂexible-price goods. Hence we set αp =0 .2. We set σ =1and a =0 .8.
However since the relative magnitudes of σ and a determine the sign of UFS, that is whether cF
t and cS
t
are Edgeworth substitutes, complements or utility separable, we will vary a in some of the simulations. We
also set θ
F = θ
S =0 .5. In addition we use the following values ¯ π =1 .01,ξ
p =0 .5,µ=6 ,γ=1 7 .5,
φ
F = φ
S =0 .82 and ξ
p =0 .5 that agree with some of the parameter values used in the monetary rules
literature that use New Keynesian models.17
The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 4. that shows the combinations of the interest rate
response coeﬃcient to inﬂation, ρπ, and weight on the ﬂexible-price inﬂation, w ∈ (0,1), that lead to either
real determinacy (D) or real indeterminacy (I). In addition it shows the combinations for these parameters
under which the MSV solution is either E-stable (ES) or E-unstable (EU). In the ﬁgure a circle with an "x"
inside stand for indeterminacy and E-instability of the MSV solution. Whereas a circle with anything inside
represents determinacy and E-instability of the MSV solution. The right panel corresponds to the case of
Edgeworth complements whereas the left panel corresponds to the case of substitutes.
The ﬁgure shows that regardless of the type of goods active backward-looking rules are more prone
to induce indeterminacy as the weight, w is reduced. In addition whether the goods are complements or
substitutes matter for the determinacy of equilibrium. In general if they are substitutes active backward-
looking rules with respect to the core inﬂation are more prone to deliver multiple equilibria than if they are
complements. These results contrast with our previous results for forward-looking rules. More interestingly
the ﬁgure also shows that regardless of the type of goods, the interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation
ρπ and the weight w the MSV solution is not learnable (E-stable).
These results suggests that it is important to analyze active backward-looking rules that respond solely
to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation. To accomplish this goal we can use the systems in (59) and (61) taking
into account that targeting explicitly the ﬂexible-price inﬂation implies that w =1 . It is possible to derive
analytical results for the determinacy of equilibrium analysis when the goods are utility separable. We they
17See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Woodford (2003) among others.
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31are either Edgeworth complements or substitutes we have to simulate. On the contrary for the learning
analysis, it is feasible to derive analytical results for all the cases. The following proposition summarizes the
analytical results.
Proposition 7
a) Consider the system (59) with w =1and assume that the government follows an active backward-
looking rules in terms of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation ( ˆ π
F) described by ˆ Rt = ρπˆ π
F
t−1 with ρπ > 1.I f
USF =0(ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are utility separable) then the rule induces a unique equilibrium.
b) Consider the system (61) with w =1and assume that the government follows an active backward-
looking rules in terms of the ﬂexible-price inﬂation ( ˆ π
F) described by ˆ Rt = ρπˆ π
F
t−1 with ρπ > 1. Then
regardless of whether USF T 0 (that is whether ˆ cF
t and ˆ cS
t are Edgeworth substitutes, complements or
utility separable), the MSV solution ˆ yt = k+P ˆ yt−1+Qˆ zt where ¯ k, ¯ P and ¯ Q solve (45)is NOT learnable
in the E-stability sense..
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 states one of the most important results of the paper: even if the rule is backward-
looking, reacting to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation will make the MSV solution E-unstable. Therefore it is not
learnable. The proposition also points out that as long as the two goods are utility separable then the rule
will guarantee a unique equilibrium. In order to complete the determinacy analysis for these rules, we use
the aforementioned parametrization to simulate the model when the goods are substitutes and complements.
The results are presented in Figure 6.
This ﬁgure shows the combinations of the interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation (ρπ)a n dt h e
intratemporal elasticity of substitution (a) that lead to either real determinacy (D) or real indeterminacy
(I). In addition it shows the combinations for these parameters under which the MSV solution is either
E-stable (ES) or E-unstable (EU). In the ﬁgure a circle with an "x" inside stands for indeterminacy and E-
instability of the MSV solution whereas circles with anything inside represent determinacy and E-instability
of the MSV solution. As argued before the relation between a and σ determines the type of goods under
consideration. For our parametrization we have that σ =1 . Hence the case of Edgeworth complements,
substitutes and utility separable correspond to a<1,a>1 and a =1 , respectively.
Figure 6 conﬁrms our results from Proposition 7: the type of goods under consideration (complements,
32Figure 5:
substitutes and utility separable) does not aﬀect the E-stability characterization of the MSV solution. This
solution is never learnable. However it also shows that the type of goods under consideration may aﬀect
the determinacy results for active backward-looking rules. Interestingly when the goods are Edgeworth
substitutes, active backward-looking rules may induce multiple equilibria.
To conclude our analysis we focus on active backward-looking rules that respond to the sticky-price
inﬂation. In this case it is not possible to set w =0and use the systems (59) and (61). The reason
is that by doing this some of the coeﬃcients of Λ and Ω in (60) and (62) become indeterminate. Hence
we have to derive new systems to pursue the determinacy and learning analyses. Furthermore we cannot
derive analytical results for the leaning analysis (only for the determinacy) analysis. Hence we prefer to
present some simulations that combine both analyses. Figure 7 presents and summarizes our results for
active backward-looking rules that respond exclusively to the sticky-price inﬂation. As in Figure 6, this
33Figure 6:
ﬁgure shows the combinations of the interest rate response coeﬃcient to inﬂation (ρπ) and the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution (a) that lead to either real determinacy (D) o real indeterminacy (I). In addition
it shows the combinations for these parameters under which the MSV solution is either E-stable (ES) or
E-unstable (EU). In the ﬁgure a circle with an "x" inside stands for indeterminacy and E-instability of the
MSV solution whereas no marker depicted represents determinacy and E-stability of the MSV solution. As
argued before the relation between a and σ determines the type of goods under consideration. For our
parametrization we have that σ =1 . Hence the case of Edgeworth complements, substitutes and utility
separable correspond to a<1,a>1 and a =1 , respectively.
It is clear from Figure 7 that active backward-looking rules with respect to the sticky-price inﬂation
will deliver a unique and learnable equilibrium regardless of the type of goods under consideration. It is
34important to emphasize that this result cannot be derived setting w =0and using the systems (59) and
(61) that were used for the analysis of rules that respond to the core inﬂation. In fact it is clear from Figure
5t h a tw h e nw =0 , the determinacy and learning results do not coincide with those in Figure 7. The reason
is that there is a discontinuity for the aforementioned systems at results w =0 .
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we develop a closed economy model with a ﬂexible-price good and a sticky-price good to
answer the following question: which measure of inﬂation should the government target in the rule in order
to guarantee a unique equilibrium whose MSV solution is learnable in the E-stability sense proposed by
Evans and Honkapojha (2001)?. We ﬁnd that the answer corresponds to the sticky-price inﬂation.
In order to ﬁnd this answer we study how the conditions under which interest rate rules lead to real
determinacy and to E-stability of the MSV solution may depend not only on the interest rate response
coeﬃcient of the rule but also on other factors. Besides the timing of the rule, we show that the measure
of inﬂation included in the rules and the type of goods under consideration may aﬀect signiﬁcantly the
aforementioned conditions.
Speciﬁcally responding to either the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation is more prone to induce
multiple equilibria (real indeterminacy). This is particularly valid under forward-looking and contempora-
neous rules and when the two goods are either Edgeworth complements or utility separable. Under these
timings of the rule and characteristics of the goods targeting the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation
makes also the MSV solution E-unstable.
More importantly backward-looking rules with respect to the ﬂexible-price inﬂation or the core inﬂation
may guarantee a unique equilibrium but in these cases the MSV solution is not learnable in the E-stability
sense. In order to guarantee a unique and learnable equilibrium only responding actively to the sticky-price
inﬂation seems to be a robust policy recommendation across timings and types of goods.
Although our selection criteria are diﬀerent, our ﬁndings agree with previous results from the Optimal
Monetary Policy literature that suggest that the central bank should target the sticky-price inﬂation such
35as Aoki (2001) and Mankiw and Reis (2002).
5A p p e n d i x
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is straightforward. a) follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 and the deﬁnition of α in (35).






fhhUF+(fh)2UFF+VFF < 0. Part c) can be proved by using the deﬁnition of α and the
deﬁnition of χ in (36) in order to rewrite χ = −
(fhhUF+UFF)¯ c
F
(fh)2UF . Then the result follows from using this in
tandem with Assumptions 1 and 2, and ¯ cS > 0. Finally d) follows from using Assumptions 1 and 2, with
µ,¯ cS,¯ cF,β,γ,¯ π>0 .
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof is straightforward. θ T 0 follows from parts a) and c) of Lemma 1 and USF T 0, ¯ cS > 0,
and ¯ cF > 0. To prove parts b) and c) we use part a) of the present Lemma and part b) of Lemma 1 ( <0).
Clearly if USF = 0 then θ = 0 which together with  <0 and the deﬁnition of τ imply τ = 1. On the
other hand if USF < 0, we use the deﬁnitions of θ, α and χ provided in (50), (35) and (36) respectively to
write τ =1− θ










. From Assumptions 1 and 2, and USF < 0 we have
that USSUF












< 1 and therefore
0 <τ<1 if USF < 0.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The characteristic polynomial for Ω deﬁned in (49) is given by P(v)=v2 − Trace(Ω)v + Det(Ω)
where Det(Ω) refers to the determinant of Ω and
Trace(Ω)=1+β −
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τwρπ)
and Det(Ω)=β (65)
Using these and the characteristic polynomial P(v) we can derive that
P(1) =
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τwρπ)
and P(−1) =
·
βδ − 2(1 + β) τw




Recall from Lemma 1 that δ>0 and  <0.
We ﬁrst prove a). By Lemma 2 we know that τ>0 and if USF ≤ 0 then τ ≤ 1. Using this and δ>0, <0,
β ∈ (0,1) and w ∈ (0,1) we can infer that ρw
π =
[βδ−2(1+β) ]





Hence 1 <ρ w
π < 1
τw. This in tandem with 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π, (66), δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1) and w ∈ (0,1)
imply that P(1) > 0 and P(−1) > 0. Moreover since Det(Ω)=β and β ∈ (0,1) then 0 <D e t (Ω) < 1. This
36together with P(1) > 0 and P(−1) > 0 imply that the two eigenvalues of Ω are inside the unique circle.
Hence the steady state is a sink (See Azariadis, 1993). Since ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are non-predetermined variables
then by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium.
To prove that 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π for any w ∈ (0,1) is also a suﬃcient condition for the MSV solution
ˆ yt = ¯ k+ ¯ Qˆ zt to be E-stable we ﬁrst ﬁnd the E-stability conditions. For the system in (48), the MSV solution
corresponds to ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt. Then following the description of the methodology that we provided in the
subsection 3.1 we can deduce that E-stability conditions are reduced to verify that all the eigenvalues of








 are less than one. This implies that the E-stability conditions will be satisﬁed whenever
that all the eigenvalues of Ω have real parts less than one. To check this it is suﬃcient to verify that all the
eigenvalues of Ω − I have negative real parts. We do so in the following way. By theorem 1.2.12 from Horn
and Johnson (1985) the eigenvalues υ1 and υ2 of Ω − I satisfy Trace(Ω − I)=υ1 + υ2 and Det(Ω − I)=
υ1υ2. Then suﬃcient and necessary conditions for all the eigenvalues of Ω−I to have negative real parts are
Trace(Ω − I) < 0 and Det(Ω − I) > 0. We calculate
Trace(Ω − I)=β −
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τwρπ)
− 1 and Det(Ω − I)=
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τwρπ)
(67)
As was proved before ρw
π < 1
τw which together with the assumption 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π, the expression for
Det(Ω − I) in (67) and δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1) and w ∈ (0,1) imply that Det(Ω − I) > 0. On the other
hand, using the expression for Trace(Ω − I) in (67) we can observe that Trace(Ω − I) < 0 is equivalent to
−(1 − β) <
βδ(1−ρπ)
 (1−τwρπ) = Det(Ω − I). This last inequality is trivially satisﬁed provided that Det(Ω − I) > 0
and β ∈ (0,1). Then E-stability of the MSV follows.
Second we prove b). By Lemma 2 we know that τ>0 and if USF > 0 then τ>1. Deﬁne the function
ˆ ρπ = 1
wτ. Using this deﬁnition and the deﬁnition of ρw













βδ > 1, lim
w→ 1
τ




π =1which together imply that ρw
π < ˆ ρπ = 1
wτ
for any w ∈ (0,1/τ). Then using this together with the assumption 1 <ρ π <ρ w
π for any w ∈ (0,1/τ)
we can proceed as we did to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium and the E-stability of the MSV
representation in a).
5.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We just need to consider (48) with w =1 . The characteristic polynomial for Ω deﬁned in (49) is
given by P(v)=v2 −Trace(Ω)v+Det(Ω) where Det(Ω) refers to the determinant of Ω. By replacing w =1
into Ω we can obtain
Trace(Ω)=1+β −
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τρπ)
and Det(Ω)=β (68)
Using these and the characteristic polynomial P(v) we can derive that
37P(1) =
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τρπ)
and P(−1) =
·
βδ − 2(1 + β) τ




Moreover we recall from Lemma 1 that δ>0 and  <0.
We ﬁrst prove a). By Lemma 2 we know that τ>0 and if USF < 0 then τ<1. Using this and δ>0,
 <0, and β ∈ (0,1) we can infer that ρ1
π =
[βδ−2(1+β) ]




[βδ−2(1+β) ]τ . Hence
ρ1
π < 1
τ. This in tandem with 1 <ρ π <ρ 1
π,(69), δ>0, <0, and β ∈ (0,1) imply that P(1) > 0 and
P(−1) > 0. Moreover since Det(Ω)=β and β ∈ (0,1) then 0 <D e t (Ω) < 1. This together with P(1) > 0
and P(−1) > 0 imply that the two eigenvalues of Ω are inside the unique circle. Hence the steady state is a
sink (See Azariadis, 1993). Since ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are non-predetermined variables then by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium.
To prove that 1 <ρ π <ρ 1
π is also a suﬃcient condition for the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k+ ¯ Qˆ zt to be E-stable
we ﬁrst ﬁnd the E-stability conditions. For the system in (48) with w =1 , the MSV solution corresponds
to ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt. Then following the description of the methodology that we provided in the subsection 3.1
we can deduce that E-stability are reduced to verify that all the eigenvalues of DTk = Ω and DTQ = Φ0 ⊗Ω
have real parts less than one. Moreover there the MSV is not E-stable if any of the eigenvalues of DTk and
DTQ are bigger than one. Hence we proceed to characterize the eigenvalues of these matrices.







 are less than one. This implies that the E-stability
conditions will be satisﬁed whenever that all the eigenvalues of Ω have real parts less than one. To check
this it is suﬃcient to verify that all the eigenvalues of Ω − I have negative real parts. We do so in the
following way. By theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985) the eigenvalues υ1 and υ2 of Ω−I satisfy
Trace(Ω−I)=υ1+υ2 and Det(Ω−I)=υ1υ2. Then a suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the eigenvalues
of Ω − I to have negative real parts are Trace(Ω − I) < 0 and Det(Ω − I) > 0. We calculate them taking
into account that w =1 . Hence
Trace(Ω − I)=β −
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τρπ)
− 1 and Det(Ω − I)=
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 (1 − τρπ)
(70)
As was proved before ρ1
π < 1
τ which together with the assumption 1 <ρ π <ρ 1
π, the expression for
Det(Ω − I) in (70) and δ>0, <0, and β ∈ (0,1) imply that Det(Ω − I) > 0. On the other hand,
using the expression for Trace(Ω − I) in (70) we can observe that Trace(Ω − I) < 0 is equivalent to
−(1 − β) <
βδ(1−ρπ)
 (1−τρπ) = Det(Ω − I). This last inequality is trivially satisﬁed provided that Det(Ω − I) > 0
and β ∈ (0,1). Then E-stability follows.
Second we prove b). By Lemma 2 we know that τ>0 and if USF ≥ 0 then τ ≥ 1. Therefore 1
τ ≤ 1.
Suppose that τ =1then from (69), δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1) we can infer that P(1) < 0. Now consider
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hτ>1. Since the rule is active (ρπ > 1)a n d1 > 1
τ then we can see that ρπ > 1
τ. Using
this, ρπ > 1, (69), δ>0, <0, and β ∈ (0,1) we derive that P(1) > 0. Hence regardless of whether
τ =1or τ>1 (equivalently USF =0or USF > 0) we have that P(1) < 0. It is easy to prove that
38P(−1) = 2(1 + Det(Ω)) − P(1). Then using this, P(1) < 0 and Det(Ω)=β>0 we can deduce that
P(−1) > 0. This and P(1) < 0 are suﬃcient to conclude that Ω has one eigenvalue inside the unit circle
and one eigenvalue outside the unit circle. Hence the steady state is a saddle path (See Azariadis, 1993).
Since ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are non-predetermined variables then by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) we conclude that there
exists multiple equilibria.
Furthermore to prove that the MSV solution is not E-stable we start by recalling there exists E-instability
if any of the eigenvalues of DTk and DTQ have real parts bigger than one. Hence we proceed to characterize
the eigenvalues of these matrices. By assumption the eigenvalues of Φ are less than one. Then we can just
focus on the eigenvalues of Ω. We want to prove that Ω has some eigenvalues with real parts bigger than
one, or equivalently that Ω − I has some eigenvalues with positive real parts. When τ =1then from (70)
we can deduce that Det(Ω − I)=
βδ
  . And using this and the facts that δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1), we deduce
that Det(Ω − I) < 0. On the other hand if τ>1 we already derived that in this case ρπ > 1
τ . Using this,
with ρπ > 1,δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1), and the expression of Det(Ω − I) in (70) allows to conclude that
Det(Ω − I) < 0. Hence regardless of whether τ =1or τ>1 (equivalently USF =0or USF > 0) we have
that Det(Ω−I) < 0. By theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985) the eigenvalues υ1 and υ2 of Ω−I
satisfy Det(Ω−I)=υ1υ2. Therefore Det(Ω−I) < 0 implies that there exists one eigenvalue with a positive
real part and the E-instability of the MSV solution follows.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We just need to consider (48) with w =0 . The characteristic polynomial for Ω deﬁned in (49) is
given by P(v)=v2 −Trace(Ω)v+Det(Ω) where Det(Ω) refers to the determinant of Ω. By replacing w =0
















Moreover we recall from Lemma 1 that δ>0 and  <0. Using this and β ∈ (0,1) it is clear that ρ0
π > 1.
Using 1 <ρ π <ρ 0
π in tandem with (72), δ>0, <0, and β ∈ (0,1) we can infer that P(1) > 0 and
P(−1) > 0. Moreover since Det(Ω)=β and β ∈ (0,1) then 0 <D e t (Ω) < 1. This together with P(1) > 0
and P(−1) > 0 imply that the two eigenvalues of Ω are inside the unique circle. Hence the steady state is a
sink (See Azariadis, 1993). Since ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are non-predetermined variables then by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium.
Next we prove that 1 <ρ π <ρ 0
π is also a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the MSV solution
ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt to be E-stable. In the the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 we derived the E-stability conditions
39that the MSV solution must satisfy. More importantly we showed that these conditions will be satisﬁed
whenever that all the eigenvalues of Ω−I have negative real parts which in turn is equivalent to check that
Trace(Ω − I) < 0 and Det(Ω − I) > 0 hold. Using w =0we obtain
Trace(Ω − I)=β −
βδ(1 − ρπ)
 




Since by assumption 1 <ρ π <ρ 0
π, then the expression for Det(Ω − I) in (73) and δ>0, <0, and
β ∈ (0,1) imply that Det(Ω − I) > 0. On the other hand, using the expression for Trace(Ω − I) in (73) we
can observe that Trace(Ω−I) < 0 is equivalent to −(1−β) <
βδ(1−ρπ)
  = Det(Ω−I). This last inequality is
trivially satisﬁed provided that Det(Ω−I) > 0 and β ∈ (0,1). Then E-stability of the MSV solution follows.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We will ﬁrst prove that regardless of USF T 0 the rule always deliver real indeterminacy. In this case
to prove determinacy is equivalent to prove that all the eigenvalues of Ω in (55) are inside the unit circle.
The equivalence follows from the fact that ˆ π
F
t , ˆ π
S
t , and ˆ cS
t are non-predetermined variables and the results
from Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
Then to prove that all the eigenvalues of Ω in (55) are inside the unit circle we proceed as follows. Recall
the Schur Theorem (See Lorenz, 1993) that states that the eigenvalues of a 3×3 matrix Ω are inside the unit
circle if and only if having the characteristic polynomial P(v)=d0v3 + d1v2 + d2v + d3 =0the following
conditions are satisﬁed i) d0 +d1 +d2 +d3 > 0; ii) d0 −d1 +d2 −d3 > 0; iii) d0(d0 +d2)−d3(d1 +d3) > 0;
iv) d0(d0−d2)+d3(d1−d3) > 0; v) d0+d3 > 0, and vi) d0−d3 > 0. Using the deﬁnition of Ω in (55) we can
derive its characteristic polynomial obtaining that d0 = −1 and d3 =
β
τwρπ. Using these it is simple to show







that β ∈ (0,1),w∈ (0,1),τ>0 (see Lemma 2) and ρπ > 1.
Second we focus on the E-stability analysis. We need to ﬁnd the E-stability conditions. For the system
in (54), the MSV solution corresponds to ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt. Then following the description of the methodology
that we provided in the subsection 3.1 we can deduce that E-stability conditions are reduced to verify that
all the eigenvalues of DTk = Ω and DTQ = Φ0⊗Ω have real parts less than one. Moreover the MSV solution
is not E-stable if any of the eigenvalues of DTk and DTQ have real parts bigger than one. Hence we proceed
to characterize the eigenvalues of these matrices.







 are less than one. Then we can just focus on
the eigenvalues of Ω. We want to prove that Ω has some eigenvalues with real parts bigger than one, or
equivalently that Ω − I has some eigenvalues with positive real parts. We do so in the following way. By
theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985) the eigenvalues υ1,υ 2 and of υ3 of Ω−I satisfy Det(Ω−I)=
υ1υ2υ3. Then a necessary condition for all the eigenvalues of Ω − I to have negative real parts is that













Consider the case USF ≥ 0. By Lemma 2 we know that τ ≥ 1. This together with δ>0, <0,
β ∈ (0,1),w ∈ (0,1),ρ π > 1, and (74) imply that Det(Ω − I) > 0. Which means by theorem 1.2.12 from
Horn and Johnson (1985) that Det(Ω − I) has at least one eigenvalue with a positive real part. Then
E-instability of the MSV solution follows.
Consider USF < 0. By Lemma 2 we know that τ<1. This together with δ>0, <0,β∈ (0,1),w∈ (0,1),
ρπ > 1 and (74) imply that there might be some values of w ∈ (0,1) and ρπ > 1 for which Det(Ω − I) < 0.
Which means by theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985) that Det(Ω − I) may have either one
eigenvalue or three eigenvalues with negative real parts. Then E-stability is possible.
5.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The proof is very simple. It is the same as the Proof for Proposition 4 taking into account that
w =1 .
5.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The characteristic polynomial for Ω deﬁned in (57) is given by P(v)=v2 − Trace(Ω)v + Det(Ω)
where Det(Ω) refers to the determinant of Ω and
Trace(Ω)=
(  − δ)β +  
  − βδρπ
and Det(Ω)=
β 
  − βδρπ
(75)
Using these and the characteristic polynomial P(v) we can derive that
P(1) =
βδ(ρπ − 1)
βδρπ −  
and P(−1) =
βδρπ + βδ − 2 (1 + β)
βδρπ −  
(76)
Moreover we recall from Lemma 1 that δ>0 and  <0. Using this, ρπ > 1 in tandem with (76),
and β ∈ (0,1) we can infer that P(1) > 0 and P(−1) > 0. Moreover it is straightforward to prove that
0 <D e t (Ω) < 1. This together with P(1) > 0 and P(−1) > 0 imply that the two eigenvalues of Ω are
inside the unique circle. Hence the steady state is a sink (See Azariadis, 1993). Since ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are
non-predetermined variables then by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) we conclude that there exists a unique
equilibrium.
Next we prove that ρπ > 1 is also a suﬃcient and necessary condition for the MSV solution ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt
to be E-stable. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the E-stability conditions. For the system in (56), the MSV solution corresponds
to ˆ yt = ¯ k + ¯ Qˆ zt. Then following the description of the methodology that we provided in the subsection 3.1
we can deduce that E-stability conditions are reduced to verify that all the eigenvalues of DTk = Ω and








less than one. This implies that the E-stability conditions will be satisﬁed whenever that all the eigenvalues
of Ω have real parts less than one. To check this it is suﬃcient to verify that all the eigenvalues of Ω − I
have negative real parts. We do so in the following way. By theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985)
the eigenvalues υ1 and υ2 of Ω − I satisfy Trace(Ω − I)=υ1 + υ2 and Det(Ω − I)=υ1υ2. Then suﬃcient
and necessary conditions for all the eigenvalues of Ω − I to have negative real parts are Trace(Ω − I) < 0
and Det(Ω − I) > 0. We calculate
Trace(Ω − I)=
 (β − 1) + βδ(2ρπ − 1)
  − βδρπ
and Det(Ω − I)=
βδ(1 − ρπ)
  − βδρπ
(77)
The assumption ρπ > 1, the expressions for Trace(Ω − I) and Det(Ω − I) in (75), and the facts that
δ>0, <0, and β ∈ (0,1) imply that Trace(Ω−I) < 0 and Det(Ω−I) > 0. Hence E-stability of the MSV
solution follows.
5.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. First we prove a) by considering the representation (59). To do we derive the characteristic polyno-
mial of the matrix Λ in (60) taking into account that w =1and that the two goods are utility separable.





















that shows that the characteristic polynomial P(v) of Λ (with w =1and τ =1 )corresponds to the product
of the polynomial P1(v) and P2(v). Hence the roots of these two polynomials will determine the eigenvalues
of Λ (with w =1and τ =1 ) . Consider the roots of P1(v). It is simple to see that if ρπ > 1 then the two




P2(−1) = 2(1 + β) −
βδ
 
Using these expressions, β ∈ (0,1) and the facts that  <0 and δ>0 (see Lemma 1) we can infer that
P2(1) < 0 and P2(−1) > 0. Which in turn implies that one of the root of P2(v) is inside the unit circle
whereas the other one is outside of it (see Azariadis, 1993). Putting these results together we conclude that
three of the roots of P(v) (or equivalently three of the eigenvalues of Λ with w =1and τ =1 )a r ei n s i d et h e
unit circle while the fourth one is outside of it. Then since ˆ π
F
t , ˆ π
S
t and ˆ cS
t are the only non-predetermined
variables we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium (see Blanchard and Kahn 1980).
Next we prove part b) by considering the system (61). In this case τ T 1. We need to prove that the
MSV solution ˆ yt = k + P ˆ yt−1 + Qˆ zt is E-unstable. To do so we recall the description of the methodology
42that we provided in the subsection 3.1. We know by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) that the MSV solution
is E-unstable if any of the eigenvalues of DTk =( I −Ω ¯ P)−1Ω,D T P =
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Γ
¤0 ⊗[(I −Ω ¯ P)−1Ω], and
DTQ = Φ0 ⊗ [(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω] have real parts bigger than one. Then we start by studying the eigenvalues of
DTk =( I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally we will prove that DTk =( I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω has some eigenvalues with
real parts bigger than one, or equivalently that
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
has some eigenvalues with real positive
parts. To do so it is necessary to ﬁnd the MSV solution. In particular we need to solve for ¯ P using the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients. From (45) we know that this matrix should satisfy ΩP2 − P + Γ =0
or equivalently (I − ΩP)−1Γ = P. However since w =1then the matrix Γ in the system (61) becomes
Γ =

     










     

(79)
w h i c hh e l pu st oh a v ea n" e d u c a t e d "g u e s sf o rP.T h a ti s
P =








     

Using this expression, the expression for Ω (with w =1 )in (62), (79) and (I − ΩP)−1Γ = P we can
prove that in this case ¯ P = Γ Utilizing this and the expression for Ω (with w =1 )in (62) we can ﬁnd the
determinant of the matrix
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
, which corresponds to Det
£







(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
< 0 since by assumption ρπ > 1,β∈ (0,1), <0,δ>0 and τ>0 (see
Lemma 2).
Finally by theorem 1.2.12 from Horn and Johnson (1985) the eigenvalues υ1,υ 2,υ 3, and υ4 of
£




(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
= υ1υ2υ3υ4. Given that Det
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
< 0,w ek n o wt h a t
£
(I − Ω ¯ P)−1Ω − I
¤
has at least one eigenvalue with a positive real part. Hence the E-instability of the MSV solution follows.
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